Modern man’s unwavering efforts to uncover the illusions that yoke themselves at the base of philosophies of history unequivocally challenges contemporary thinkers to respond to questions concerning historical judgement, and the identity we can appropriate within the spatio-temporal condition of human existence. In Paul Ricoeur’s ontology of finitude, the question of personal identity is undetachable from the historical past and present. In this article, therefore, so we shall endeavour to discuss the question of identity within the context of historical narration. To be a self, a finite cogito, and to grasp one’s own way of being in time are inseparable endeavours. Self consciousness occurs within the reappropriation of the historical past, while the future unfolds new possibilities. Such interplay between the past and the future takes place at the level of both individuals and communities.



                Ricoeur sets the ball rolling by an analysis of the philosophy of language, his critique of the theory of interlocution from the point of view of self-identity leads him to a resolution of the dilemma of the self and other, but only by undercutting the radical dichotomy that exists between them. Dilemma was what Edmund Husserl gave to the philosophy of language. According to Husserl, “I can know the other only by analogy to myself”. There is a certain duality in the heart of the problematic of the self and other. So Ricoeur’s task centres on constructing a notion of intersubjectivity that preserves the uniqueness of self-identity while at the same time bridges the gap between self and other. 


                Ricoeur’s treatment of the problem of identity is historical. The theory of narrative already shapes the problem of personal identity as Ricoeur tackles it, making the search for the narrative dimension of history the search for the told tells about the action of the ‘who’; And the identity of this “who” therefore must be a narrative identity’.




1.             The problem of identity and the polemics of analytic philosophy of language


                Right at the core of Ricoeur’s discussion of the identity of the self is the thesis that identity can be conceived in the sense of either the Latin ipse (self) or idem (sameness). While idem implies sameness, ipse «implies no assertion concerning some unchanging core of the personality » . Ipse can be used to express the experience of the self in time, the category under which subjectivity adheres.

                Ricoeur’s method is to think through the process of identification by the analytic arguments from semantics to pragmatics, guarding in an impeccable manner the rapport between the problem of identity and that of self-identity. The basic polemical trust of Ricoeur’s argument could be viewed as a critique of analytic theories of reference and reflexivity and could be constructed as follow: (1)  while semantics conceives of identity only as sameness (idem), (2) pragmatics (speech-act theory) goes beyond identity to self identity by interlocution, (3) but theories of interlocution consider identity only on the basis of sameness or idem (40 so, the basic trust of the movement from semantics to pragmatics is towards particularity a conception of self identity based on ipsèrè.


                Can the logic of the move from semantics to pragmatics account for the transition from the concept of the self based identity to one that can acknowledge otherness and temporal particularity? If not, then this reconceptulization of the self at the level of a theory of interlocution need be pondered. Although the analytic arguments may be tending towards a more particular conception, they are still unable to conceive of the self as an entity that changes over time and this is a limitation.


                As representative of the semantic type of argumentation, Ricoeur samples Strawson’s work, Individuals, and argues that the self is “neutralized by being included within the same spatiotemporal schema as all the other particulars”. The concept of identity is expressed as sameness (mêmetè) and not as selfhood (ipsèite). In fairness to Strawson, Ricoeur acknowledges the uniqueness of his strategy.


« The advantage of this new strategic decision is certain: to say that bodies are the first basic particulars is to eliminate, as possible candidates, mental events; that is, representations or thoughts whose shortcoming is that they are private rather than public entities. Their lot, as specific predicates of persons, is simply postponed. They first had to be dislodged from the dominant position of ultimate reference, which they occupy in subjectivist idealism ».


                The consequence of this strategy of approach is that it tends to eliminate the problem of the so-called ‘lived-body’, that is, the body that is experienced as belonging to a particular self. While being able to characterize selfhood by reference to sameness, this view overlooks the particularity associated with the self as an entity living through and within time. 


                On the other hand the theory of interlocution, (pragmatics) moves beyond identifying reference to consider the utterance of speakers. In this way, the ‘illocutionary act’ is joined to the act of ‘predication’ by concentration on the reflexive implication of the notion of utterance. Ricoeur believe that this concentration on the utterance of the utterance. In short, utterance equals interlocution. It does seem that the emphasis on the one who utters would allow for the expression of the self as a unique someone who makes this particular utterance as a testament to his own identity. Here then, speech-act theory falls short, for the reflexivity that characterizes it does not assure us to bringing out the particularity of selfhood, it rather manifests itself as itself as sameness,


« ultimately, one would have to say that reflexivity is not intrinsically bound up with a self in the string sense of a-consciousness».


                Ricoeur is of the view that the intersubjective character of the speech-act is derived from the fact that the utterance ‘is mirrored in the act of another. The result is a ‘reflexivity without selfhood’. But speech-act theory can take a leap further in that by ‘anchoring’ interlocution in the ‘speaking subjects’ the particular experience of the speakers would have to be taken into account.


                The move to speech-act theory has been to mean a step beyond the philosophy of the subject. So, the movement to the philosophy of language conceived in this sense was though to overcome the dilemma of subjectivity. This step was achieved at a certain price, as D.  Rasmussen observes. “Only by reducing the phenomenon of subjectivity to sameness, and then scarifying the temporality of the individual self, could speech-act theory achieve a rational explanation of interlocutionary activity. If one were to accept Ricoeur’s argument, it would appear that the interlocutionary act taken as event would drive speech-act theory beyond itself. But even if it does not, it would still be impossible in purely illocutionary terms for one to account for the self as embodied and temporal”.


                This in effect is to say that speech-act theory retains the Cartesian bias of the disembodies self. E could say that such an approach retains the traces of a philosophy of identity.


                It is also pertinent to cast a glance at the manner in which continental philosophy has appropriated the philosophy of language in the form of speech-act theory especially. It is the immediate recourse to a theory of intersubjectivity. A classical instance is Jürgen Habermas’s attempt to overcome the dilemma of the philosophy of consciousness by recourse to speech-act theory which achieves its goal, but only at a certain price; that is, by a false reduction of self to other under the rubric (guise) of the identity of discourse. This attempt itself is suspect since it relies on another system of identities, namely, identities expressions and this requires a narrative theory as its complement.


                   The green light has been shown: if we go forward remaining within the confines of the philosophy of language, it is possible to contextualize self identity as narrative identity. In effect, this is the task for a theory of narrative.



II. The self and personal identity


                Since the analytic philosophies of language could only conceptualize an identity in terms of sameness, the problematic of subjectivity gradually finds its way once again into the philosophical scene. To be able to address the issue squarely and offer an adequate solution to this problem, it is necessary to show first, what it means to conceptualize an identity that can be characterized temporally and, second how one can achieve this characterization linguistically. In Ricoeur’s estimation, the first issue borders on personal identity while the second concerns narrative identity.


In this discussion on personal identity, it is worthwhile to note that the conceptualization of sameness (idem) privileges similitude. Ricoeur says that “sameness is a concept of relation and a relation of relation”. The most radical form or first in the order of expression of this sameness of similitude is “numerical identity”. We say of two different things that they represent one and the same thing, for example, a equals b. Here identity denotes oneness, whereas the contrary is plurality .To this  notion of identity corresponds the notion of identification, seen in the sense of reidentification of the same, which makes cognition recognition : the same thing twice. This deals with the level of quantity. In the second level we have “qualitative identity”, in other words extreme resemblance : if we say that x and y are wearing the same suit, it means, clothes that are so similar that they are interchangeable with  no noticeable difference. This second component corresponds to the operation substitution without semantic loss, “salva veritate”.


These two components of identity are irreducible to one another, as are in the Kantian categories of quantity and quality. But they are not foreign to one another, such that the reidentification  of a series of such occurrences with  the passage of time provokes doubt and hesitation, and the extreme resemblance of two or more occurrences can be appealed to as an indirect criterion to reinforce the presumption of numerical identity. This is what happens when we speak of the physical identity of a person. To recognize someone here and now is no problem but doubt surfaces when we try to compare a present perception with a recent memory. In this case, the criterion of similitude begins to weaken when applied to a current perception in relationship to a memory.


                The weakness of this criterion of similitude, according to Ricoeur suggests that we appeal to another criterion, one which belongs to the third component of the notion of identity, namely “’ the uninterrupted continuity” which would postulate a relationship between present and past, in the development of what we consider to the same individual. Thus we say of an oak tree that it is the same from the acom to the fully developed tree. The demonstration of this continuity functions as a supplementary or a substitution criterion to similitude; the demonstration rests upon the ordered series of successive changes, which taken one by one, threaten resemblance without destroying it. This is how we see photo of ourselves at successive ages of our life. Time is here a basic factor of dissemblance and of divergence. The threat that time represents for identify is not entirely dissipated according to Ricoeur, unless, “ we can posit at the base of similitude and of the uninterrupted continuity, a principle of permanence in time’’ This will be for example, the invariable structure of a tool, of all whose parts will gradually have been replaced. The idea of structure, opposed to that of event, replies to this criterion of identity, the strongest one that can be applied. This confirms the relational character of identity, which elude the ancient formulation of substance but which kant reestablished by classifying substance among the categories of relation,


“as the condition of possibility of conceiving change as happening to something which does not change, … permanence in time does becomes the transcendental of numerical identity”.


                So the problematic of personal identity will entirety revolve around this search for a relational invariant, giving it the firm significant of permanence in time.


                We can hen anticipate the argument on personality identity in terms of the already posited dialectic between sameness and selfhood, between “idem” and ipse”. One cannot stop at sameness. But through the introduction of the category of temporality, the question becomes one to attempting to get beyond the reduction to sameness, which eliminates the different forms which self-identity takes over time. One has to then find away in which the self endures, such that earlier forms of identity can be associated with later forms of identity without reduction to sameness. Ricoeur’s solution is to designate identity through character. In its most elemental form character is defined as “the set of lasting dispositions by which a person is recognized”. In this way it constitutes the limit point where the problematic of “ipse” becomes indiscernible from that of “idem” and where one is not inclined to distinguish them from one another. The Aristotelian origin of this designation is apparent. The self is known by its character. In its most originary sense character announces itself and be so designated through habit. As Ricoeur puts it “habit gives a history to character”. Habits can manifest themselves as in process of being formed, and they can be already acquired. In terms of the dialectic between “idem” and ipse”, they give the appearance of sameness to a changing self. In fact, habit tends to abolish the appearance of innovation by giving the appearance of sameness. In Ricoeur’s terms it is here that ‘ipse’ manifests itself as ‘idem’.



III. Narrative identity:  the dialectic of selfhood and sameness.


                In Ricoeur’s Time and narrative volume 3, he discusses narrative identity. Here he ties the question of identity to narrative by suggesting that the best response to the question “who is the author of agent?” is to tell the story of a life. The permanent identity of a person, presupposed by the designation of a proper name, is provided by the conviction that it is the same subject who perdures through his diverse acts and words between birth and death.



“The story told tells about the ‘who’. And the identity of this ‘who’ therefore itself must be narrative identity”.


                Ricoeur even surmises that without recourse to narration, the problem of personal identity would be irresolvable.


                A narrative can link the past with the future by giving a sense of continuity to an ever changing story of the self. Because narrative has this potentiality it is uniquely to express the ongoing dialectic of selfhood and sameness while at the same time it can allow one to rethink the meaning of subjectivity. The way in which narrative identity is initially expressed if through “fictional narratives”.


                Fictional narratives disclose “character” through “emplotment”. In Ricoeur’s expression there is a kind of “discordant concordance” which is conveyed through narrative which in philosophical terms may be conceived as a “synthesis of the heterogeneous”. Ricoeur acknowledge the instability of narrative identity. Narrative identity can be made unmade, since it is possible to weave different plots through the same personage, even if these oppose one another. The plot accounts for “diverse mediations” between “disparate components of the action and the sequence of the story. That is to say that narratives link events together by giving account of the intention of the actors so that the character appears to have a certain chronology. Narratives make sense out of self-identity in the context of time.



                Narratives account for action. But they do so in complex ways. In the dialectic between plot and character narrative resolves the potential contraction between the two by granting to the character an initiative and assigning narrative the power of determining the beginning, middle and end of the action. This is the dilemma of tragedy. The protagonist appears to be the author of his own activity while spectator and chorus alike know that the narrative will eventually overwhelm the character in such a manner that the must succomb to the obvious unfolding of events.


                Ricoeur then is of the view that the dialectic between action and character produces a dialectic internal to the character.


“narrative identity is not that of immutable substance or of a fixed structure but, the mobile identity issuing from the combination of the concordance of the story, taken as a structured totality, and the discordance imposed by the encountered events”.


                At the same time as the recounted actions receive their temporal unity of the story from the plot, the characters of the story can also to be plotted out (mise en intrigue). They are recounted at the same time as the story is told. This then forces the identity of character to be summed up in the history of a life. Chance is transmuted intofate Freedom yields to necessity. We are literally “entangled in stories,” according to W. Schapp’s beautiful title “In Geschichten Verstrickt”.


                Ricoeur’s most brilliant   insights is to reconceived this dialectic of concordance and discordance on a higher level as the dialectic between sameness and selfhood, a set of “imaginative variations” entertained by the narrative.  This is the very point of narrative. Narrative does not seek to conceal this dialectic but rather it seeks out the contractions.


                One can in fact develop a stand for the interpretation of fiction from this point of view. There is on the one hand, the kind of the 19th century literature which seeks to favour sameness of character, to which can be contrasted a kind of 20th century literature which subject selfhood to almost infinite variation. the latter reflects a loss of identity while the former concentrates on identity. Selfhood is defined by sameness, as in, the character of Rosekolnikov, “Man without Qualities” in which Ricoeur says, selfhood is exposed by “taking away the support of sameness”.


                This reflection can also be used as a clue to the distinction between literary and technological (science fiction) forms of narrative. Here Ricoeur appeals to his hermeneutical background for the distinction. in literature we encounter beings like ourselves who are anchored to the world through their corporal condition. That is in literature action is mediated through suffering. With science fiction the case is different. The focus is upon technology, while the brain is taken to be equipment of the person. The problematic for science fiction is the mediation of identity through sameness as it resolves identity at the conceptual level, whereas that of literary can be said to be selfhood or “selfhood in its dialectic relation to sameness”.


                Narrative identity operates at the level of both individual and communal identity Ricoeur cites the example of psychoanalytical case histories to illustrate individual identity. Here the subject commits itself to a “talking-cure”. A working – through (Durch arbeitung) of unintelligible and unbearable experience until some narrative emerges by which the analysand can acknowledge its self-constancy in and through change.


                Subjects, communities can come to imagine and know themselves in the stories they tell about themselves. By way of exemplification Ricoeur chooses biblical Israel. This case is particularly typical for Ricoeur since few communities have been so intrinsically mobilized by the narrative they have told about themselves. Through  its sacred narrative, biblical Israel formed the historical community that bears its name. in a typical hermeneutic circle we discover an historical Jewish community drawing its identity from the reinterpretation of those texts it has itself created. This circle is not confined to case-histories of individuals or collective histories of people. It is a basic narrative structure of human-being-in-the world.



IV.  Narration: Between prescription and description


                As we have already seen in our treatment, that narrative can thematise action, it can also be the bridge to ethical life. Put it another way, it can bridge the gap between the ascription of action to an agent who has the capacity to act and the imputation to an agent who has the obligation to act” . Narrative has the unique capacity to conceive of that obligation mimetically. Aristole could claim that “tragedy” can be conceived mimetically in relationship to “action and life”. Here through narrative we have the relationship between mimesiss, bio and praxis.


                However fiction cannot be applied to life praxis without complications. This is say that, the organization of one’s life history and the fictional account are different. But fiction however compliments life history. In this sense narrative identity has a relationship with ethical life. Hence Ricoeur denies that the narrative has purely aesthetical dimension. Reflecting Kant’s critique of Judegment one takes pleasure in following the destiny of a character through the analogy to the thought experiment, narration offers ethics new ways to evaluate character and action.


                Ricoeur had introduced the dialectic of selfhood and sameness under character and self-constancy. While character refers to the different moments in which selfhood expressed itself, self-constancy referred to “keeping one’s word”. Narrative not only poses possible problematic of selfhood and sameness but also when applied to real life, invites difficulties. When one moves from fiction to real life the potential for loss of identity as the case of Musil’s  Man Without Qualities is refigured as the self in reality is «confronted with the hypothesis of its own nothingness». Here on the ethics platform can be self confronted with the potentiality of its own nothingness assert itself as a moral agent? Citing Levinas’ example of promise-keeping Ricoeur confirms that narrative identity is not equivalent to «true self-constancy except through this decisive moment which makes ethical responsibility the higher factor in self-constancy». What it means is that narrativity carries within itself a certain evaluative or prescriptive dimension. The persuasion imposed by narrators to readers has ethical appeals. “change your life! Was the  call of the Grecian statue to the readers of the poet Rilke; and Ricoeur agrees that most narrative works share something of this summons.



V. Time and Narrativity


                The most important thing about narrative is its ability to make apparent the temporal dimension of selfhood, which (of course) must be obliterated if the theory of interlocution is said to be a triumph over the philosophy of the subject.


                So in this sense it would be necessary to reconceive a theory of interlocution in the context of time. As Ricoeur says, «every speech-act (or every act of discourse) commits the speaker and does so in the present». In this sense ‘assertions’ are not more empty identities but utterances in a temporal context which carries with them immediate implications of sincerity and commitment.



«I cannot assert something without introducing a tacit clause of sincerity into my saying it, in virtue of which I effectively signify what I am saying, any more than I do so without holding as true what I affirm».


                If we conceive promise or commitment within the concept of time it caries the implication that we will be bound to it. «By promising I intentionally place myself under the obligation of doing what I say I will do». If one obligates oneself in the present it is also clear that one will have some obligation in the future. To make a promise has the obligation of keeping it. If I say “I will do it”, this according to Ricoeur implies, not only that the statement “becomes my act” but that I will inscribe my act in the course of things? In this sense the speech-act occurs at the juncture of internal and cosmological time. On the one hand this “act” forms my commitment with the present, while on the other, that act coordinates the activity of an individual within the course of things. Such act carries ethical implication which commits one to a certain form of participation in an historical present.


VI. Narrative Subjectivity


                Ricoeur in time and narrative registers the point that “narrative” is the «guardian of time, insofar as there can be no thought about time without narrated time». With this claim Ricoeur reconstructs Husserlian thematic with regard to time since Hussserl’s thematic with regard to time since Husserl’s context of time raised critical questions concerning the validity of intersubjective knowledge. In the “Fifth Mediation”, Husserl attempted to verify the experience of the other, he did so within the framework of internal time-consciousness. What is shared between self and other is time, even though the other has to be experiences “somatically” in space. In terms of this spatial metaphor, I can build up my experience of the other through my sphere of owness to include the otherness of the other but only through appresention, that is, the indirect presentation of the other.


«My own ego however, the ego given in constant self-perception, in actual now with the content belonging to his here. Therefore an ego is appresented as other than mine».


                The radical question here is how can one have valid knowledge of the other as a body since valid knowledge is achieved at the indirect level of appresentation? If, of course, one reduces selfhood to sameness the problem would disappear.


                Turning to the argument on temporality Husserl adopts the same pattern of analysis of the spatial and perceptual character of bodily apprehension. Initially, it is my experience of myself that is experienced temporally. In line with husserl, one constructs a phenomenological account of experience of temporality as it relates to knowledge by showing how, through the experience of the past and the future in an ever expanding now, it (temporality) is at the foundation of valid knowledge of the self. That is to say that the temporal dimension of the experience of someone follows the pattern similar to the spatial dimension. Husserl refers to a ‘common time form’ which occurs as a consequences of the ‘coexistence of my ‘polar’ Ego and the other Ego, of my whole concrete ego and his, my intentional life and his, my ‘realities’ and his’.


                For Husserl, this leads to the ground that every primodial temporality automatically acquires the significance of being merely an original mode of appearance of objective temporality to a particular subject: in effect he made the claim as it were from the inside, that internal time is related to objective time. «In this connection we see that the temporal community of the constutively interrelated monads is indissoluble, because it is tied up essentially with the constitution of a world and a world time».


                There is a marked difference between world time and the time of the phenomenological Ego, such that knowledge of the other as it is mediated through the temporality of the phenomenology subject is discontinuous with the self. This returns once gin to the problem of the validity of knowledge at the level of intersubjectivity.


                Ricoeur has shown how narrative identity resolves the discontinuity between calendar or cosmic time and internal time through its capacity to integrate an account of the self within the context of a large framework. The spectacular advantage of such an endeavour is that one can preserve the distinctive character of the experience of the self within the framework of the constancy of time.



Evaluation and Conclusion


                In our discussion so far we have seen how Pual Ricoeur anchors the problem of identity on narration. He even surmises that without recourse to narration the problem of personal identity would be irresolvable.


                The problem of knowing the self had long been there since human kind started philosophizing. Socrates was credited with the dictum “man know thyself”. He was simply calling for an examination of personal identity. Philosophers down the ages have addressed themselves to this task and in the heat of the debates as to what really constituted personal identity some ended up denying it. Hume is foremost in the denial of personal identity, all is but mere fluidity of thought.


“For my part, when I enter more intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble in some particular perception or the other, of heart or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I can never catch myself at anytime without a perception and can never observe anything but the perception”.


                Taking a deeper reflection into the Humean position certain questions flash through our minds. Who are we then? Are we a collection of scattered and heterogeneous fragment of life, incapable of sustaining self-constancy? Are we no longer a singularity with a unique personal identity? Ricoeur’s treatment answers this second question in the affirmative appealing to the doctrine of the narrative identity as solution to the problem of personal identity. The narrative dimension of history is the search for identity he contends.


                Taking off from the philosophy of language Ricoeur has brought out a clear distinction between the narrative identity of self (ipse) and a substantialist or formalist identity of sameness. The narrative self constitutes an on-going process of self-constancy and self-rectification which synthesizes the different horizons of the past, present and future. Developing this textual analogy, Ricoeur has shown that identity as ipse (soi-même) can include mutability and transformation within the cohesion of one’s lifetime. This means that the identity of the human subject is recognized as a perpetual task of reinterpretation in the light of the stories we tell about ourselves and others.


                Particularly interesting here is Ricoeur’s import of narrative self-identity. This demonstrates that the age-old virtue of self-knowledge (first promoted by Socrates and Seneca) involves for us today not some egotistical or narcissistic ego but an examined life freed from ideological dogmatism. The ethical subject of self knowledge is purged and freed by the cathartic effects of narrative be they historical or fictional.


                Narrative identity poses itself ultimately not only as an answer but as a question. That is why we will never cease to be puzzled by the age-old challenge – “who do you say that I am?”. There is a fundamental fluidity built into the principle of narrative identity by virtue of the fact that it is founded on narrative imagination. Narrative identity can be made and then unmade. If we grant this, then narrative identity cannot say the last word on the identity of the subject, neither as a particular individuality nor as part of a community of individuals. Furthermore, Ricoeur’s approach to the question of identity still permits the easy speculative binding of the present to the past, a binding always taking the form of a narrative.

                Ricoeur’s stance on narrative identity receives support from a number of contemporary quarters including recent works by Charles Tavlor, Alasdair Mclntyre, and Seyla Benhabibi. Benhabib, for example, observes in her book, ‘Situating the Self’ that “the Enlightenment conception of the disembodied cogito no less than the empiricist illusion of a substance –like self cannot do justice to those contingent processes of socialization through which an infant becomes a person… capable of projecting a narrative into the world of which she is not only an author but an actor as well” .


                We can then say that Ricouer is not isolated in promoting what Benhabib calls the “narrative structure of personal identity”. Ricoeur’s effort remains one more inestimable contribution to our understanding of personal identity.





Rioceur, P., Oneself another, tr. K. Blamey, Chicago: University Press, 1992.


Ricoeur, P., Ethos for Europe, trans. P. Koslowski, Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1992.



Ricoeur, P., Time and Narrative, vol. 3, trans. K. Blamey and D. Pelleauer, Chicago: University of Chicago press, 1988.


Benhabib, S., Situating the Self: Gender, Community and Post Modernism in Contemporary Ethics, New York: Routedge, 1992.


Arendt, A., The Human Condition, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1958.


Hume, D., Treatise on human nature, Oxford: Clarendon, 1978.


Husserl,E., Cartesian Meditations, trans. D. Carirns, The Hague: Maryinus Nijhoff, 1960.


Kant,I., Critique of Pure Reason (Original Publ. 1781), New York: Anchor Books, 1966.


Kearney, R., «Narrative Imagination: between ethics and poetics» in Philosophy and Social Criticism, vol. 21, n. 5/6, London: Sage Pubs. Ltd., 1995.


Rasmussen, D., «Rethinking subjectivity» in philosophy and Social Criticism, vol. 21, n. 5/6, London: Sage Pubs. Ltd., 1995.


Strawon, P., Individuals, London: Methuen, 1957.


Ricoeur, P., Oneself as another, tr. Kathleen, Blamey, Chicago: The University Press, 1992, p. 2.

Ibid., p. 32.

Ibid., p. 33.

Ibid., p. 47.

Rasmnnssen, D., “Rethinking Subjectivity” in Philosophy & social criticism. Vol. 21, no 5/6, London: sage pubs. Ltd., 1995, p. 163.

Ricoeur, P., Op. cit., 166.

Ibid., p. 117.

Kant, I., Critique of pure reason (Original Publ. 178), New York: Anchor Books, 1966, A143, B183.

Ibid ., p. 121.


Ricoeur, P., Time and Narrartive,  vol. 3,  trans.K. Blamey and D. Pellauer, Chicago: University o Chicago Press, 1988,  p.  246.

Riceour, P., OP.cit., p. 141.

Ricoeur, P., New Ethos for Europe, trans. Koslowski,Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1992, pp. 107-109

Ricoeur,P., Op. cit., p. 149;

Ibid., p. 150.

Ricoeur, P., Time and Narrative, vol. 3, p. 248.


Ricoeur, P. Oneself as Another, p. 152.

Ibid., p. 166

Ricoeur, P., Time and Narrative, vol. 3, p. 249.

Ibid., p. 232.



Ricoeur, P., Time and Narrative, vol. 3, p. 241.


Husserl, E. Cartesian Meditations, trans. Dorrion, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960, p. 119.

Ibid., p. 128.


Hume, D., Treatise on Human Nature, Oxford: Clarendon, 1978, p. 300.

Benchabib, Seyla, Situating the self: Gender, Community and Post modernism in Contemporary Ethics. New York; Routedge, 1992, p. 5.